Passer en revue les conceptions de la maladie qui s’expriment dans la tradition juive est une entreprise risquée et qui – l’auteur de ces lignes en a fait maintes fois l’expérience – expose le théologien de service qui a accepté d’en traiter ex cathedra aux tirs de barrage de ceux-là même, spécialistes d’autres disciplines, qui l’ont prié de le faire. Je prends donc ce risque, non sans demander au lecteur de faire preuve de cette disposition favorable du cœur et de (...) cette humilité de l’esprit, sans lesquelles l’écoute de l’autre n’est que politesse formelle, ou concession momentanée de parole de la part d’un interlocuteur qui n’a un instant endigué le fleuve de ses certitudes que pour les déverser ensuite sur l’imprudent que vous êtes, dès qu’il estimera que vous avez épuisé vos chances de le convaincre. À l’instar de son collègue chrétien, et peut-être avec plus de rigueur, le théologien juif est confronté à un dilemme. D’une part, conscient de l’auguste dignité de l’être humain, créé à l’image de Dieu, mais aussi de sa faiblesse et des difficultés de sa condition incarnée, il voudrait passionnément parler de Lui à ses semblables, leur dire ce qu’il attend d’eux, en termes que chacun et chacune puissent comprendre et accepter. Par ailleurs, s’il n’est pas lui-même dévoyé ou démagogue, il sait que ce Dieu, dont il s’efforce d’exposer les voies et les exigences, agit et s’exprime souvent de manière tellement déconcertante, à vue humaine, que le simple énoncé de ses actions et de ses paroles, telles qu’elles sont relatées dans les Écritures, risque de scandaliser les esprits les mieux disposés. Dieu ne dit-il pas lui-même (Ex 20, 5) : "Je suis un Dieu jaloux qui punis la faute des pères sur les enfants, les petits-enfants et les arrière-petits-enfants pour ceux qui me haïssent." Ou encore : (Dt 32, 35) : "À moi la vengeance et la rétribution, pour le temps où leur pied trébuchera…" Contrairement à une opinion très répandue, il ne s’agit pas là de conceptions vétérotestamentaires «totalement étrangères à l’Évangile d’amour de Jésus-Christ». En témoignent des passages néotestamentaires tels que ceux-ci : [C’est Jésus qui est censé parler (1), en faisant allusion au jugement eschatologique]: "Quant à mes ennemis, ceux qui n'ont pas voulu que je règne sur eux, amenez-les ici, et égorgez-les en ma présence." (Lc 19, 27). "Quand le Fils de l'homme viendra dans sa gloire, escorté de tous les anges, alors il prendra place sur son trône de gloire… Alors il dira encore à ceux de gauche: Allez loin de moi, maudits, dans le feu éternel qui a été préparé pour le diable et ses anges…" (Mt 25, 31-33; 41) À la lumière de cet aperçu, forcément sommaire, il est facile d’entrevoir que les réponses de l’Écriture et de la tradition juive au dramatique problème de la souffrance humaine, en général, et à celui de la maladie, en particulier, risquent d’être tout aussi dérangeantes, voire scandaleuses pour le croyant moyen. Je procéderai, ci-après, à un inventaire sommaire des conceptions relatives à la maladie, telles qu’elles s’expriment dans les écrits bibliques canoniques (I), dans le Nouveau Testament (II), et dans la littérature rabbinique des premiers siècles (III), en les illustrant par des textes de référence, choisis parmi ceux qui font autorité tant pour le judaïsme que pour le christianisme. Enfin, dans la dernière Partie de cette étude (IV), je brosserai, à grands traits, un panorama des opinions et des croyances des penseurs juifs orthodoxes, du Moyen Âge à l’époque moderne, et des comportements qu’ils préconisent face à la maladie et aux souffrances qui en découlent. Tenant compte du fait que, sauf exception, je m’adresse à un public non versé dans les sciences juives, j’ai choisi de donner à mon exposé un caractère plus descriptif que spéculatif. (shrink)

Emch, G.G., Liu, C.: The Logic of Thermostatistical Physics. Springer, Berlin/ Heidelberg (2002) 11. Frigg, R., Werndl, C.: Entropy – a guide for the perplexed. Forthcoming in: Beisbart, C., Hartmann, S. (eds.) Probabilities in Physics. Oxford  ...

In this book, I deal with some fundamental problems of the Hegelian dialectic. For this purpose, I take a middle course between total scepticism, which considers dialectic as a devastator sophistry with no respect even for the non-contradiction principle, and authoritarian dogmatism, which claims to solve any question with the magic wand of the Hegelian Aufhebung. That is, I decide to be critical, defining concepts anew, bringing out sources, determining conditions of possibility and fields of validity, accepting or rejecting when (...) necessary. Following G. R. G. Mure's thinking, from an inner point of view I examine whether, in carrying out his work, Hegel remains faithful to the different principles he proclaims, and I find substantial deviations. And, following W. Becker's thinking, from an external point of view, that is, from a formal, empirical or existential contemporary angle, I try to determine the extent to which we may legitimately talk about the fruitfulness of Hegelian dialectic. In this way, I reconstruct Hegel's thought so that it may become acceptable to us-readers of the twentieth-century-as intelligible and coherent as possible. I conclude that dialectic, as a logic of human reality, has to be grasped and expressed from the viewpoint of the particular historical individual, in constant interaction with the cultural environment of his or her time. Using this approach, I investigate the questions at issue from Hegel's Logic point of view. (shrink)

Розкрито сутність поняття «рейтинг». Доведено значущість рейтингової оцінки для суб’єктів фінансового ринку, зокрема для страхових компаній, потенційних страхувальників, інвесторів та кредиторів.

The daring idea that convention - human decision - lies at the root both of necessary truths and much of empirical science reverberates through twentieth-century philosophy, constituting a revolution comparable to Kant's Copernican revolution. This book provides a comprehensive study of Conventionalism. Drawing a distinction between two conventionalist theses, the under-determination of science by empirical fact, and the linguistic account of necessity, Yemima Ben-Menahem traces the evolution of both ideas to their origins in Poincaré's geometric conventionalism. She argues that (...) the radical extrapolations of Poincaré's ideas by later thinkers, including Wittgenstein, Quine, and Carnap, eventually led to the decline of conventionalism. This book provides a fresh perspective on twentieth-century philosophy. Many of the major themes of contemporary philosophy emerge in this book as arising from engagement with the challenge of conventionalism. (shrink)

The daring idea that convention - human decision - lies at the root both of necessary truths and much of empirical science reverberates through twentieth-century philosophy, constituting a revolution comparable to Kant's Copernican revolution. This book provides a comprehensive study of Conventionalism. Drawing a distinction between two conventionalist theses, the under-determination of science by empirical fact, and the linguistic account of necessity, Yemima Ben-Menahem traces the evolution of both ideas to their origins in Poincaré's geometric conventionalism. She argues that (...) the radical extrapolations of Poincaré's ideas by later thinkers, including Wittgenstein, Quine, and Carnap, eventually led to the decline of conventionalism. This book provides a fresh perspective on twentieth-century philosophy. Many of the major themes of contemporary philosophy emerge in this book as arising from engagement with the challenge of conventionalism. (shrink)

The daring idea that convention - human decision - lies at the root of so-called necessary truths, on the one hand, and much of empirical science, on the other, reverberates through twentieth-century philosophy, constituting a revolution comparable to Kant's Copernican revolution. Conventionalism is the first comprehensive study of this radical turn. One of the conclusions it reaches is that the term 'truth by convention', widely held to epitomize conventionalism, reflects a misunderstanding that has led to the association of conventionalism with (...) relativism and postmodernism. Conventionalism, this book argues, did not contend that truths can be stipulated, but rather, that stipulations are often confused with truths. Their efforts were thus directed toward disentangling truth and convention, not reducing truth to convention."--Jacket. (shrink)

This book explores the role of causal constraints in science, shifting our attention from causal relations between individual events--the focus of most philosophical treatments of causation--to a broad family of concepts and principles generating constraints on possible change. Yemima Ben-Menahem looks at determinism, locality, stability, symmetry principles, conservation laws, and the principle of least action-causal constraints that serve to distinguish events and processes that our best scientific theories mandate or allow from those they rule out. Ben-Menahem's approach reveals (...) that causation is just as relevant to explaining why certain events fail to occur as it is to explaining events that do occur. She investigates the conceptual differences between, and interrelations of, members of the causal family, thereby clarifying problems at the heart of the philosophy of science. Ben-Menahem argues that the distinction between determinism and stability is pertinent to the philosophy of history and the foundations of statistical mechanics, and that the interplay of determinism and locality is crucial for understanding quantum mechanics. Providing historical perspective, she traces the causal constraints of contemporary science to traditional intuitions about causation, and demonstrates how the teleological appearance of some constraints is explained away in current scientific theories such as quantum mechanics. (shrink)

In a situation in which several explanations compete, is the one that is better qua explanation also the one we should regard as the more likely to be true? Realists usually answer in the affirmative. They then go on to argue that since realism provides the best explanation for the success of science, realism can be inferred to. Nonrealists, on the other hand, answer the above question in the negative, thereby renouncing the inference to realism. In this paper I separate (...) the two issues. In the first section it is argued that a rationale can be provided for the inference to the best explanation; in the second, that this rationale cannot justify an inference to realism. The defence of the inference rests on the claim that our standards of explanatory power are subject to critical examination, which, in turn, should be informed by empirical considerations. By means of a comparison of the realist's explanation for the success of science with that of conventionalism and instrumentalism it is then shown that realism does not offer a superior explanation and should not, therefore, be inferred to. (shrink)

The paper provides a new characterization of the concepts of necessity and contingency as they should be used in the historical context. The idea is that contingency (necessity) increases in direct (reverse) proportion to sensitivity to initial conditions. The merits of this suggestion are that it avoids the conflation of causality and necessity (or contingency and chance), that it enables the bracketing of the problem of free will while maintaining the concept of human action making a difference, that it sanctions (...) tendencies without recourse to teleology, and that it recasts the controversy between historicists and anti‐historicists in less dogmatic language. (shrink)

This paper offers an interpretation of Poincaré's conventionalism, distinguishing it from the Duhem–Quine thesis, on the one hand, and, on the other, from the logical positivist understanding of conventionalism as a general account of necessary truth. It also confronts Poincaré's conventionalism with some counter-arguments that have been influential: Einstein's (general) relativistic argument, and the linguistic rejoinders of Quine and Davidson. In the first section, the distinct roles played by the inter-translatability of different geometries, the inaccessibility of space to direct observation, (...) and general holistic considerations are identified. Together, they form a constructive argument for conventionalism that underscores the impact of fact on convention. The second section traces Poincaré's influence on the general theory of relativity and Einstein's ensuing ambivalence toward Poincaré. Lastly, it is argued that neither Quine nor Davidson has met the conventionalist challenge. (shrink)

This book subjects the traditional concept of law of nature to critical examination. There are two kinds of reasons that invite this reexamination, one deriving from philosophical concerns over the traditional concept, the other motivated by theoretical and practical changes in science. One of the philosophical worries is that the idiom of law of nature, especially when combined with the notion of laws 'governing' individual events and processes, is no longer as intelligible as it used to be in the theistic (...) context in which the formulation of laws became central to science. The traditional concept is also challenged in various ways by contemporary scientific theories such as quantum mechanics, chaos theory and the general theory of relativity. It is no longer clear that there are any universal laws, laws do not always guarantee predictability, and the border between physical and mathematical considerations is constantly shifting. The most difficult challenge, perhaps, is to come up with a scientific explanation of the origin of laws. Wrestling with these intriguing problems, the papers in this volume broaden both our understanding of the natural order and our desiderata of scientific explanation. (shrink)

This paper examines Quine’s web of belief metaphor and its role in his various responses to conventionalism. Distinguishing between two versions of conventionalism, one based on the under-determination of theory, the other associated with a linguistic account of necessary truth, I show how Quine plays the two versions of conventionalism against each other. Some of Quine’s reservations about conventionalism are traced back to his 1934 lectures on Carnap. Although these lectures appear to endorse Carnap’s conventionalism, in exposing Carnap’s failure to (...) provide an explanatory account of analytic truth, they in fact anticipate Quine’s later critique of conventionalism. I further argue that Quine eventually deconstructs both his own metaphor and the thesis of under-determination it serves to illustrate. This enables him to hold onto under-determination, but at the cost of depleting it of any real epistemic significance. Lastly, I explore the implications of this deconstruction for Quine’s indeterminacy of translation thesis. (shrink)

This paper deals with the dependence of directionality in the course of events-or our claims concerning such directionality-on the modes of description we use in speaking of the events in question. I argue that criteria of similarity and individuation play a crucial role in assessments of directionality. This is an extension of Davidson's claim regarding the difference between causal and explanatory contexts. The argument is based on a characterisation of notions of necessity and contingency that differ from their modal logic (...) counterparts on the one hand, and from causality and chance on the other. I show that some types of directionality are perfectly compatible with both determinism and indeterminism at the microscopic level, and that there is no likelihood of, or advantage to, reducing such directionality to other laws or causal processes. (shrink)

In Phaedo 115c-e Socrates scornfully rebukes Crito for enquiring how Socrates should be buried for Crito had not been persuaded by the previous arguments that burying Socrates’ body is not equal to burying Socrates. A parallel account is found in Aelian and Diogenes Laertius where Apollodorus is rebuked for attempting to persuade Socrates that he should be bothered how his remains would be clothed when laid out. Several scholars have suggested this should not be considered a copy of Plato but (...) an early proto-type written by one of his contemporaries with particular regard to Euclides of Megara. While this thesis has been criticized, further evidence will be examined in this article where the character of Apollodorus cites an unnamed Megarian examining this same argument but with conclusions different from those in Plato. Here the Megarian concludes that though the body may be separate from the soul we still show care and grief for the remains. The argument is both cogent and non-metaphysical in approach but characterized from a Socratic perspective. In the conclusions, I will attempt to reopen the case for a Euclidean origin of the Crito vignette in Phaedo 115c-e. (shrink)

_ Source: _Volume 10, Issue 3, pp 370 - 381 The argument of this paper is that counterfactuals are indispensable in reasoning in general and historical reasoning in particular. It illustrates the role of counterfactuals in the study of history and explores the connection between counterfactuals and the notions of historical necessity and contingency. Entertaining alternatives to the actual course of events is conducive to the assessment of the relative weight and impact of the various factors that combine to bring (...) about a certain result. Counterfactuals are essentially involved in understanding what it means for an event, an action, or an individual to make a difference. Making a difference, in turn, is shown to be a central category of historical reasoning. Counterfactuals, though sensitive to the description they use, make objective claims that can be confirmed or disconfirmed by evidence. (shrink)

The ArgumentIdealizations and approximations are an indispensable tool for the scientist. This paper argues that idealizations and approximations are equally indispensable for the philosopher of science. In particular, it is shown that the deductive model of scientific theories is an idealization in precisely the same sense that frictionless motion is an idealization in mechanics. By its very nature, an idealization cannot be criticized as not being absolutely true to the facts, for it need not be. Thus, the usual type of (...) criticism levelled against the deductive model is shown to be irrelevant. The main step in the argument consists in using a logic of approximation to clarify the notions of approximate implication and approximate entailment, which are usually rejected as hopelessly vague. More generally, the conception underlying the paper is that the desiderata of science should be formulated in such a way that complying with them could be a matter of degree, and that pragmatic considerations could be taken into account. This conception is motivated by the wish to introduce some quantitative concepts in the philosophy of science, thereby bringing the philosopher's perspective closer to that of the scientist. (shrink)

The ArgumentEinstein's concept of causality as analyzed in this paper is a thick concept comprised of: (a) regularity; (b) locality; (c) symmetry considerations leading to conservation laws; (d) mutuality of causal interaction. The main theses are: 1. Since (b)–(d) are not elements of Hume's concept of causality, Einstein's concept, the concept embedded in the theory of relativity, is manifestly non–Humean. 2. On a Humean conception, Newtonian mechanics is a paradigmatically causal theory. Einstein, however, regarded this theory as causally deficient, for (...) it fails to comply with both (b) and (d). Special relativity was (partly) motivated by the wish to correct the first of these failures; general relativity the second. 3. Ironically, general relativity, based on the thick concept of causality, opens the way for a conventionalist understanding of that concept. 4. With regard to human freedom, Einstein professed to be a Spinozist. However, he suggested a version of soft determinism, not found in Spinoza. (shrink)

This book offers a critical introduction to the work of American philosopher D. G. Leahy (1937-2014). Leahy's fundamental thinking can be characterized as an absolute creativity in which all creating is 'live' -- a happening occurring now that manifests a supersaturated polyontological actuality that is essentially created by the logic that characterizes it. Leahy leaves behind the categorial presuppositions of modern thought, eclipsing both Cartesian and Hegelian subjectivities and introducing instead an essentially new form of thinking founded in a nondual (...) logic of creation. The new thinking delineates the absolute unicity of existence as a creative interactivity beyond all traditional dichotomies (such as one vs. many, unity vs. plurality, identity vs. change): a fully "digitized" actuality that is nothing but newness, which inherently implies nothing but change. Through this new form of thinking, change itself is revealed to be the very essence of reality and mind. Any reader looking for a quantum leap beyond the thrall of modern and postmodern fixations is invited to hear and apprehend this new thinking that refuses to be conditioned by paradigms, categories, species, genera, walls, bridges, boundaries, or abstractions: an essentially free thinking that embodies creative novelty itself. (shrink)

This book provides a survey of the major issues in the philosophy of mathematics, such as ontological questions regarding the nature of mathematical objects, epistemic questions about the acquisition of mathematical knowledge, and the intriguing riddle of the applicability of mathematics to the physical world. Some of these issues go back to the nascent years of mathematics itself, others are just beginning to draw the attention of scholars. In addressing these questions, some of the papers in this volume wrestle with (...) them directly, while others use the writings of philosophers such as Hume and Wittgenstein to approach their problems by way of interpretation and critique. The contributors include prominent philosophers of science and mathematics as well as promising younger scholars. The volume seeks to share the concerns of philosophers of mathematics with a wider audience and will be of interest to historians, mathematicians and philosophers alike. (shrink)

The richness of Putnam's philosophical oeuvre consists not only in the broad spectrum of problems addressed, but also in the transformations and restructuring his positions have undergone over the years. The essays collected in this volume are sensitive to both these dimensions. They discuss Putnam's major philosophical contributions to the theory of meaning, the philosophy of mind, the philosophy of science and mathematics, and moral theory. But, in addition, tracing threads of change and continuity, they analyze the dynamics underlying the (...) unfolding of Putnam's thought. The volume also constitutes a critical introduction to a number of central issues in contemporary philosophy, including quantum logic, realism, functionalism, the 'minds as computer' metaphor, and the fact/value dichotomy. (shrink)

Mark Jay Steiner, a brilliant and influential philosopher of mathematics, whose interests and accomplishments extended beyond that field as well, passed away on.

According to Mark Steiner, Wittgenstein’s intense work in the philosophy of mathematics during the early 1930s brought about a distinct turning point in his philosophy. The crux of this transition, Steiner contends, is that Wittgenstein came to see mathematical truths as originating in empirical regularities that in the course of time have been hardened into rules. This interpretation, which construes Wittgenstein’s later philosophy of mathematics as more realist than his earlier philosophy, challenges another influential interpretation which reads Wittgenstein as moving (...) in the opposite direction, from a more realist toward a less realist position. Both of these readings, I argue here, tend to overlook the crucial role of conventionalism in shaping Wittgenstein’s later philosophy. I show that during the transition period, Wittgenstein was first strongly attracted to conventionalism, but then, upon discovery of the rule following paradox, came to realize its weaknesses. Did this realization mark the end of the liaison with conventionalism and a wholehearted acceptance of the empirical regularities account? Illustrating Wittgenstein’s ongoing ambivalence toward conventionalism and pointing to his novel understanding of this position, I answer this question in the negative. (shrink)

Poincaré’s conventionalism has thoroughly transformed both the philosophy of science and the philosophy of mathematics. In the former it gave rise to new insights into the complexities of scientific method, in the latter to a new account of the nature of (so-called) necessary truth. Not only proponents of conventionalism, such as the logical positivists, were influenced by Poincaré, but also outspoken critics of conventionalism, such as Quine, Putnam, and (as I will argue) Wittgenstein, were deeply inspired by conventionalist ideas. Indeed, (...) during the twentieth century, most philosophers of science and mathematics engaged in dialogue with conventionalism. As is often the case with complex ideas, there is no consensus about the meaning of conventionalism in general and Poincaré’s original version of it in particular. Nonetheless, notions such as underdetermination (of theory), empirical equivalence (of incompatible theories), implicit definition, holism, and conceptual relativity, all of which can be linked to Poincaré’s writings, have become central to philosophy. In tracing the flow of Poincaré’s ideas through the philosophical space of the twentieth century, this article emphasizes not only the stimulus provided by his actual views but also the effects of misreading and unjustified appropriation. (shrink)